Course at IAP-PUC, First Semester 2009, Tuesdays 16.30-17.50h, by Daniel von Wachter
Contact: epost@ABCD.de - replace "ABCD" by "von-wachter"
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Are there true moral statements? Are moral statements, such as "Black's murdering Smith was morally wrong", true or false at all? Some have claimed that they are expressions of emotions and therefore neither true or false. Others have claimed that they are all false. So are there objective moral facts? Is it sometimes something to be discovered whether a certain action was right or wrong? And if so, are moral facts reducible to something else?
In this course we will address these question and questions connected to them. Sometimes this field is called "metaethics" today. The core text of this course is: McNaughton, David, Moral Vision (1988). Further contemporary as well as ancient texts will be studied.
General objective: Develop and defend an answer to a philosophical question, in writing and orally.
Special objectives
- Understand the most important questions, positions, and arguments in the debate.
- Find the true answers.
Contents
- How does one best write a philosophical article?
- Singular and general moral statements
- Duties versus commands
- Are moral statements true or false?
- What motivates an action?
- Internalism, Externalism, Non-cognitivism, Belief-Desire-Theory
- Can an action be motivated without a desire? Can a belief motivate an action?
- Does the diversity of cultures and moral opinions show that there are no true moral statements?
- Weakness of will
- What is an evil man?
Method:
- Lecture and discussion.
- Disputationes (discussion between students with allocated positions)
- Short writing assignments.
- All participants are required to do the essential readings every week.
Evaluacion
- An essay (3.000 words) to be written after the course (50 %).
- Writing assignments and contributions to the classes (50 %).
Advice
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Go to the next session.
Martes, 10/3/2009
Introduction
Martes, 17/3/2009
Task for this session:
Read: McNaughton, ch. 1 and 2.
Answer in writing:
What is moral realism? (“Moral realism is the view that ...”.) Memorise and understand this!
What is moral cognitivism? What is moral non-cognitivism?
Put forward briefly the argument against moral cognitivism which you find strongest. (Put it forward, do not just describe it or write about it. Take the argument from McNaughton.)
Extra sessions: Lunes, 23/3/2009, y Miercoles, 25/3/2009, 15.00-16.20h
Advice on working techniques:
- Electronic bibliography management (Zotero, Jabref, Bibus, Endnote)
- Bibliography styles
- Efficient text processing (OpenOffice, LaTeX, Word, Abipro)
- Reading philosophical texts, notes taking
- The explanation method
- Speed reading
- Memory technique
- Philosophers' index
- Internet resources
Tuesday, 24th of March, 2009
For this session
- Read Moral Vision, chs. 1 and 2.
- Last week you began to produce a list with definitions of positions. Keep improving and updating it. Add to your list of definitions of positions definitions of: Externalism, internalism, the belief-desire theory.
- Present in 100-300 words the position of non-cognitivism. Write as if you were a non-cognitivist.
- Put forward in 100-300 words in writing the argument against non-cognitivism which you consider to be the strongest. Write as if you were a cognitivist. Use one of the arguments McNaughton puts forward.
Tuesday, 31st of March, 2009
For this Session
- Keep you list of definitions updated and memorise it.
- Read Mackie, Ethics ch. 1.
- Read again MV ch. 2.
- Answer briefly from the Humean point of view what motivates an action.
- Answer in 100-300 words in writing: How does internalism together with the belief-desire theory lead to non-cognitivism? Which two ways out does the realist have?
Tuesday, 14th of April, 2009
For this Session
- Once more, define in writing: Internalism; Belief-Desire Theory; Non-Cognitivism. Drum them into your head so that you can state them from the top of your head.
- Answer again in writing: Answer in 100-300 words in writing: How does internalism together with the belief-desire theory lead to non-cognitivism? Which two ways out does the realist have?
- Make sure you master MV ch. 1. and ch. 2.
- Study: Smith: The Moral Problem [= MP], ch. 1. Further, read the chapters where he defends the belief-desire theory and internalism.
- Make sure you master Mackie, Ethics, ch. 1.
Tuesday, 21st of April, 2009
For this Session
- Study: MP, ch. 2.
- Read: A.J. Ayer, 1936, Language, Truth, and Logic, ch. 6 (Condensed version, Wikipedia, Summary)
- Read: Hare, 1952, The Language of Morals. (More on Hare)
- Put forward briefly two objections against non-cognitivism. Use McNaughton's four arguments.
- Present Ayer's dilemma for descriptivism
28.4.2009
For this session: Answer in writing (1000-2000 words): Are moral judgements neither true nor false?
(Use the arguments and positions you found in McNaughton, Ayer, Smith, and Hare (and Mackie).
12.5.2009
For this session: Study McNaughton, Moral Vision, chs. 3, 5, 7.
Further reading: von Hildebrand, Ethics, ch. 17.
2.6.2009: The principle of phenomenal conservatism (Huemer) or of credulity (Swinburne)
9.6.2009, Weakness of Will
For this session, read MV, chs. 8-9 and texts referred to.
16.6.2009
For this session, write an essay, 2000 - 3000 words, following the instructions (in German), answering the question:
How is weakness of will possible?
If you want to formulate the question differently, please contact me. Readings:
- McNaughton, Moral Vision, chs. 8-9 and texts referred to
- "Weakness of Will", SEP, and texts referred to.
If you want credits for this course, send me again the essays written for this course by the end of the semester.
23.6.2009
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Core text:
McNaughton, David, Moral Vision (1988)
Important texts
- Hildebrand, Dietrich von, Ethics
- Mackie, J.L., 1977, Inventing Right and Wrong
- Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica; Ethics
Collections of articles:
- Gensler, H.J. u.a. Hg., 2004, Ethics: Contemporary Readings,
London: Routledge.
- Sterba, J.P. Hg., 1998, Ethics: The Big Questions, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Further texts:
- Brentano, Franz von, 1889, Vom Ursprung sittlicher
Erkenntnis.
- Broad, C.D., 1930, Five Types of
Ethical Theory, ditext.com.
- Dancy, Jonathan, 2000, Practical Reality, see the discussion in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003, 423-467.
(Handlungsgründe sind unabhängig von unseren Wünschen und
Überzeugungen, sondern gründen auf den Dingen und ihrem Wert.)
- Dancy, Jonathan, 1994, Moral Reasons.
- Foot, Philippa, 2001, Natural Goodness (dt. Übs.
erhältlich). Tugendethik.
- Foot, Philippa. 2002. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gensler, Harry J., 1998, Ethics: a contemporary introduction.
- Habermas, Jürgen, 1983: Moralbewußtsein und
kommunikatives Handeln; 1991: Erläuterungen zur
Diskursethik.
- Hildebrand, Dietrich von, Ethics
- Huemer, Michael, 2006, Ethical Intuitionism,
Kap. 5, "Moral Knowledge",
Rezension von D.
McNaughton, Precís by Huemer (2009) in PPR and replies by other authors, andere
Aufsätze von M. Huemer.
- Ingarden, Roman, 1970, Über die Verantwortung: Ihre ontischen Fundamente
- Kutschera, Franz von, 1999, Grundlagen der Ethik, Verlag de
Gruyter.
- Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 1884, Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie
- Lowe, E. J. 2003. "Rational Action, Freedom, and
Choice." Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2,
Artikel
als PDF-Datei herunterladen (auch auffindbar über
http://oaister.org).
- MacIntyre, After Virtue
- Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica; Ethics (These and other texts you find on fair-use.org and
ditext.com.
- Mele, Alfred R., 2003, Motivation and Agency.
- Nagel, Thomas, 1970, The Possibility of Altruism.
- Nelson, Leonard, , Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.
(Neukantianer. Theorie der wahren Interessen.)
- Oderberg, David S. 2000. Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist
Approach. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Parfit, Derek, Climbing the Mountain, Manuskript,
PDF
(HIER
andere Texte von Parfit)
- Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons
- Scheler, Max, 1912, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der
Moralen.
- Scheler, Max, 1916, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
- Seifert, Josef, Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung
- Sidgwick: Methods of Ethics
http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/sidgwick/me/
- Smith, Michael, 1994, The Moral Problem
- Spaemann, Robert, 1990, Glück und Wohlwollen. S.a.
Philosophische Essays (Reclam).
- Swinburne, Richard, The Coherence of Theism, 188-209
(Defends objective morality.)
Vertreter der wichtigsten Positionen (vgl. McNaughton, S. 15):
- Intuitionism: GE Moore, WD Ross, HW Prichard, CD Broad.
- Non-Cognitivism/ Expressivism: Ayer, Stevenson, Hare. More recently: John
Mackie, Simon Blackburn, Gilbert Harman, Bernard Williams.
- Recent moral realists: John McDowell, David
Wiggins, Mark Platts, John Finnis, Jonathan Dancy; Hilary Putnam, Thomas Nagel,
Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Werner, David Brink.
- Non-naturalists:
Free Will
- Pink, Thomas, 2004, Free Will: A Very Short Introduction.
- Wachter, Daniel von, 2003, "Free Agents
as Cause"
- Beckerman, Ansgar, "Haben wir einen freien
Willen?"
- Swinburne, Richard, 1997, The Evolution of the Soul, Kap.
13.
- Kane, Robert, Free Will, Blackwell.
Legal Positivism
- J. White & D. Patterson, 1999, Introduction to the Philosophy
of Law: Readings and Cases.
- Spaemann, Robert, "Die Aktualität des Naturrechts",
Philosophische Essays, Reclam.
- Finnis, John, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights.
(Verteidigt Naturrecht)
- Norbert Hoerster, 1989, Verteidigung des
Rechtspositivismus.
(Beachten Sie, daß die Behauptung, daß es objektive
moralische Gesetze gibt, noch über die z.B. von McNaughton vertretene
Behauptung, daß es objektive moralische Tatsachen gibt hinausgeht. Man
kann behaupten, daß es wahre moralische Einzelurteile gibt wie
"Müllers Mord an Huber war böse", ohne zu behaupten, daß es
wahre moralische Allgemeinurteile gibt wie "Töten ist (immer) böse".)
"Wenn es keinen Gott gibt, gibt es keine objektive Moral"
- Swinburne, Richard, The Coherence of Theism, Kap. 11.
- Adams, R.M. ‘A modified divine command theory of ethical
wrongness’ in Helm, P. ed Divine Commands and Morality (OUP, 1981),
pp. 83-108
- Pike, N. ‘Omnipotence and God’s ability to sin’ in
Helm, P. ed Divine Commands and Morality (OUP, 1981), pp. 67-82
- Morris, T.V ‘Duty and divine goodness’ in ’ in Morris,
T.V. ed The Concept of God (OUP, 1987), pp 107-121
Zur Einführung in die Philosophie
- Warburton, Nigel, 2004, Philosophy: The Essential Study Guide,
London: Routledge.
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Hg. Robert Audi.