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Richard Schantz

God

Philosophers have usually spelled out the claim that there is a God as the claim that there is a bodiless person who is omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and perfectly good and free. This claim is called 'Theism'. It is also claimed by theism that God is the creator and sustainer of the universe. That God is a person means that he can act intentionally and for reasons. As Christian doctrine claims that God consists of three persons, sometimes instead it is said that God is a 'personal being'. That God is eternal can be understood either as the claim that God is outside of time or that he is everlasting, i.e. exists at all times. Thus theism includes quite different views of God. However, both views, the timelessness view as well as the everlastingness view, maintain that God is imperishable, that he is the creator of the universe, that he can answer prayers, and that he can perform miracles such as raising a man from the dead.

If omnipotence and omniscience were understood as meaning that God can do and knows 'everything', meaning everything that can be described, then certain paradoxa would result, such as 'God can create a square circle' or 'God can create a stone that is too heavy for him to lift'. There is a consensus that 'everything' must be spelled out so that it expresses just the idea that God's power and knowledge is maximal and not limited by any lack. God has the power to do everything that he can possibly do, and he knows everything that he can possibly know. But there is much debate about how exactly this is to be formulated and what exactly this includes, for example whether this includes infallible knowledge of all future free actions.

Belief in the existence of God can be justified through evidence or through perception. (Swinburne 2004; Alston

1994; against theism: Mackie 1982) Alvin Plantinga and the 'Reformed Epistemology' have emphasised that belief in God can also be justified without evidence. Plantinga (2000) has furthermore argued that if belief in Christian doctrine is true then it probably also has 'warrant' and is knowledge.

Does God have parts? Certainly God does not have concrete parts, i.e. parts which could be separated from the other parts. In this he is like other non-embodied persons, like human souls or angels. But philosophers particularly in the Latin tradition (especially Augustine, Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and Thomas Aquinas), who held that God is outside of time, developed the view that there are no parts or distinctions of any kind in God. This is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Thus Anselm wrote: 'Life and wisdom and the other [attributes], then, are not parts of You, but all are one and each one oft hem is wholly what You are and what all the others are.' (*Proslogion*, § 18) Thomas Aquinas claimed that God is neither composed of matter and form, nor of subject and nature, nor of essence and existence, nor of subject and accident. (ST I, Q 3)

Uncontroversial about this is that God has no concrete parts. Also human souls are supposed to be simple in this sense. More controversial is the claim that while human souls have different properties, God does not. The following assumptions are possible motives for the doctrine of divine simplicity: 1. There are property universals. They exist in God's mind. Therefore God himself does not have properties. 2. If God were not simple, then he would not be perfect. 3. Non-temporal entities are not composed of properties.

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Daniel von Wachter

Good Life, The

The question of wherein lies the good life, well-being, welfare, happiness, or *eudaimonia* has been at the centre of moral philosophy since antiquity. These notions might be defined to mean different things, but there is no consensus in the literature on anything but the fact that they are at least closely related. A notion like 'happiness' has a subjective ring and might sometimes refer to something like a feeling, but when philosophers study the matter, irrespective of whether they do so in terms of 'happiness' or some other notion, they tend to be concerned with how well a person's life is going prudentially, *i.e*., for the sake of the person leading the life.

With respect to the issue of parts and wholes there are two main concerns. The first arises for any account of the human good: what is the relation between momentary well-being and the having of a good life? The second arises only for pluralist accounts: what is the relation between having realized different kinds of goods in one's life and leading a good life on the whole. There are many different views on what constitutes a good life, but at least in modern moral philosophy the most common approach is atomistic. The ambition is to list a number of basic goods the accumulation of which make our lives go better (or, conversely, the reduction of which will make our lives take a turn for the worse). The best example of this approach is hedonism, which holds that the goodness of a life is simply the net balance of pleasure over pain in that life. More complex atomistic theories might provide longer lists of basic goods, but they share the assumption that certain proper parts of any given life contribute certain amounts of value – the goodness of that life as a whole simp-